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BREAKING BAD? TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL BANKS NOT 
GUILTY AS NOT CHARGED 
NIZAN GESLEVICH PACKIN

 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, rating agencies,
1
 regulators,
2
 global 
organizations,
3
 and academics
4
 have argued that large banks receive 
significant competitive advantages because the market still perceives them 
as likely to be saved in a future financial crisis.
5
 Therefore, not only do the 
largest banks enjoy the economic safety benefits of being large and 
diversified, but they also receive implicit as well as explicit and direct 
government subsidies.
6
 The most significant subsidy, an implicit one, 
 
 
  Assistant Professor of Business Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City 
University of New York. I thank David Skeel, Gideon Parchomovsky, and Charles W. Mooney Jr. for 
supplying helpful comments incorporated in this Commentary. 
 1. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, BANKS: RATING METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 11 
(2011), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Ratings_EMEA/2011-11-09_CB 
Event_CriteriaFIBankRatingMethodologyAndAssumptions.pdf (predicting government assistance to 
banks becoming a permanent factor in forming banks’ credit, “regardless of governments’ recent and 
emerging policy response.”).  
 2. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke believes that taxpayer-funded bank 
subsidies should end. See Christopher Ryan, Elizabeth Warren: Too-Big-To-Fail Banks Get 
$83bn/Year Subsidy. Why?, AM. BLOG (Feb. 28, 2013, 12:41 PM), http://americablog.com/2013/02/ 
elizabeth-warren-83bn-bank-subsidy.html. 
 3. See Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/12/128, 
2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12128.pdf (arguing that large 
banks receive substantial rewards because the bigger they are, the more disastrous their failure would 
be, and estimating the subsidy to the ten biggest banks at $83 billion annually).  
 4. See, e.g., Who is Too Big to Fail: Does Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act Enshrine Taxpayer-
Funded Bailouts?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Svcs., 113th Cong. 69 (2013) (written testimony of David A. Skeel, Jr., Professor of Corporate 
Law at the Univ. of Pa. Law Sch.), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/ uploadedfiles/hhrg-
113-ba09-wstate-dskeel-20130515.pdf (large banks, “[a]mong other benefits . . . borrow money much 
more cheaply than other financial institutions, because their cost of credit is artificially reduced by the 
Too Big to Fail subsidy.”).  
 5. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya, et al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of 
Implicit State Guarantees 3, 13 (Working Paper, Dec. 2013), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1961656 (arguing that “[t]he implicit subsidy provided large financial institutions [an 
annual] funding cost,” and that the “passage of Dodd-Frank did not eliminate expectations of future 
government support”); Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion 
of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive 1–7 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on 
Collective Goods, Working Paper 2013/23, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2349739.  
 6. Put simply, subsidies are a method of financial support given to those in need without any 
pay-back obligation on the receiving end. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1174 
(10th ed. 1996). Subsidies can take various forms and can be granted using different types of policies, 
which include direct transfers of funds and support or indirect assistance. Doug Koplow, Case Studies 
of Subsidy Reform and Sustainable Development: Energy, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
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stems from market perception that the government will not allow the 
largest banks to fail—i.e., that they are “too-big-to-fail” (“TBTF”)7—
enabling them to borrow at lower interest rates.
8
 Focusing on these 
subsidies, recent media reports sent shockwaves across financial markets 
by estimating the value of the financial advantages for the six largest U.S. 
banks since the start of 2009 at $102 billion.
9
 On November 14, 2013, the 
Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) issued the first of two reports on 
the benefits large banks receive because of their size.
10
 A less obvious yet 
highly-related issue is large banks’ exemptions from criminal statutes. 
This issue was not mentioned in the 2013 report, but should be included in 
the 2014 report that will examine the economic advantages the largest 
banks receive because of implied government support. Specifically, in this 
Commentary, I argue that this exemption contributes to the subsidies’ 
economic value while also creating incentives for unethical and even 
criminal activity.  
Before analyzing the elements of such exemptions, it is critical to first 
understand large banks’ subsidies framework in which such a benefit 
exists. The 2013 report was the result of a highly controversial debate on 
 
 
SUBSIDY REFORM AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL ECONOMY ASPECTS 93 (2007), 
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/case-studies/inc/cs-inc-oecd-SubsidyReform-PoliticalEconomy-
en.pdf. Justice Brennan explained the distinction between direct subsidies and tax exemption as 
follows:  
 A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public monies to the subsidized enterprise and 
uses resources exacted from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, on the other hand, involves 
no such transfer. It assists the exempted enterprise only passively, by relieving a privately 
funded venture of the burden of paying taxes.  
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 690 (1970) (footnote omitted). He explained that 
direct subsidies involve government “forcibly” diverting the income of taxpayers to the recipient, 
whereas exemption involves government “merely refrain[ing] from diverting to its own uses income 
independently generated . . . through voluntary contributions.” Id. at 691 (citing from Donald A. 
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development–Part II. The 
Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 553 (1968)).  
 7. See Robert Johnson, Introduction to ROOSEVELT INST., MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 9 
(Robert Johnson & Erica Payne eds.) (2010), available at http://www.makemarketsbemarkets.org/ 
report/MakeMarketsBeMarkets.pdf (“The structure of our current financial markets . . . has not been 
subject to the most important principle of all—the opportunity for market participants to fail.”). 
 8. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the 
Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 800–01 (2011); Stefan 
Jacewitz & Jonathan Pogach, Deposit Rate Advantages at the Largest Banks 4 (Working Paper, Feb. 
21, 2014), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2018474.  
 9. Bob Ivry, No Lehman Moments as Biggest Banks Deemed Too Big to Fail, BLOOMBERG 
(May 9, 2013, 11:00 PM), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-10/no-lehman-
moments-as-biggest-banks-deemed-too-big-to-fail.html.  
 10. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-18, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BANK 
HOLDING COMPANIES: STATUTORY CHANGES TO LIMIT FUTURE SUPPORT ARE NOT YET FULLY 
IMPLEMENTED (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659004.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/7
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the existence and nature of such subsidies, especially following the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act,
11
 but there is still disagreement as to 
whether large banks actually receive any subsidies.
12
 Certain 
commentators argue that large banks deserve different treatment because 
they create benefits for businesses that would not be available elsewhere;
13
 
the banking field facilitates substantial scale economies,
14
 which make 
 
 
 11. Despite the big banks’ attempts to prove that the Dodd-Frank Act would render their 
advantages insignificant, they have only been able to point to one independent academic research team 
that has found that the megabanks’ market advantages diminished because of the Dodd-Frank rules 
(concluding that the Act “has been effective in reducing” the subsidy). Bhanu Balasubramnian & Ken 
B. Cyree, Has Market Discipline on Banks Improved After the Dodd-Frank Act? 2 (Working Paper, 
Nov. 2, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2349042. 
 12. The voices arguing against the existence of the subsidy appear to come exclusively from the 
financial services industry, and, therefore, should (i) be sorted out from objective research undertaken 
by more neutral experts, and (ii) not be viewed equally. See, e.g., Examining the GAO Study on 
Government Support for Bank Holding Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., 
& Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014) (written testimony of Simon Johnson), available at http://www. 
banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=982071a1-e2fd-4d02-bacc-
962d4683affb (“Perhaps most worryingly for the validity of future analysis, the GAO seems to weight 
all “expert” opinion equally, irrespective of whether the work in question was undertaken by people 
who work for big banks . . . If the GAO cannot sort out sensible analysis from sophisticated lobbying, 
then its important follow-up report on the current value of implicit subsidies to large banks is unlikely 
to have much value.”). Such financial services industry members’ reports include various reasonings 
as to why no subsidy exists. See, e.g., Press Release, Fin. Servs. Forum, et al., Fin. Indus. Addresses 
Alleged Large Bank Subsidy (Mar. 11, 2013), available at http://images.politico.com/global /2013/03/ 
10/financial_industry_addresses_alleged_large_bank_subsidy_11_march_13.html; STEVE STRONGIN 
ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS, GLOBAL MARKETS INST., MEASURING THE TBTF EFFECT ON BOND 
PRICING (2013), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/ regulatory-
reform/measuring-tbtf-doc.pdf (arguing that the six biggest U.S. banks enjoyed a funding advantage, 
which reversed to a disadvantage after the financial crisis); Michel Araten, Credit Ratings as 
Indicators of Implicit Government Support for Global Systemically Important Banks 1 (Working 
Paper, May 31, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2272800 (arguing that “market data 
discounts the notion of government support” for big banks); Bert Ely, Revisiting an Old Debate: Do 
Banks Receive a Federal Safety Net Subsidy?, 18 NO. 21 BANKING POL’Y REP. 1, 1 (1999) (arguing 
that “banks pay all costs of banking’s federal safety net”); Mark Whitehouse, Too-Big-to-Fail Myths, 
Goldman Sachs Edition, BLOOMBERG (May 28, 2013, 1:25 PM), available at http://www.bloom 
berg.com/news/2013-05-28/too-big-to-fail-myths-goldman-sachs-edition.html.  
 13. Charles W. Calomiris, Debate: Should Big Banks Be Broken Up?: The Opposition’s Opening 
Statements, ECONOMIST (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/ 
977 (arguing that the largest banks’ product diversity, large scale, and global reach create unique 
advantages for their customers). 
 14. See, e.g., Non Interest Expense as Percent of Assets, FY2012, All Banks Reported to FDIC, 
12/31/2012, OPTIRATE, available at http://bankblog.optirate.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/NonInt 
ExpToAssets2012.jpg (showing significant economies of scale with the largest Banks); David C. 
Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, Do Large Banks Have Lower Costs? New Estimates of Returns to Scale 
for U.S. Banks, 44 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 171 (2012); Joseph P. Hughes et al., Are Scale 
Economies in Banking Elusive or Illusive? Evidence Obtained by Incorporating Capital Structure and 
Risk-Taking into Models of Bank Production, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 2169 (2001) (finding that bank 
holding companies of all sizes were operating with significant returns to scale and that increased risk-
taking is associated with smaller-scale economies); Allen N. Berger & Loretta J. Mester, Inside the 
Black Box: What Explains Differences in the Efficiencies of Financial Institutions?, 21 J. BANKING & 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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large banks a source of gains for society
15
 that justify Congress’s support. 
Therefore, they essentially argued that the largest banks are unique and 
worth protecting because they leverage revenue and cost synergies through 
economies of scale, and as a result create benefits, that pass on to their 
customers and investors and lower the costs of finance for the entire 
society.
16
  
One of the benefits large banks receive is a non-monetary semi-
exemption from criminal statutes that contributes to their subsidies value. 
Indeed, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) allows for “deferred 
prosecution” and advances settlements instead of criminal charges for 
large financial institutions when they violate criminal laws such as money 
laundering and drug trafficking.
17
 This semi-immunity policy, nicknamed 
“too-big-to-jail,”18 also translates into an additional economic advantage 
that only the largest banks enjoy.
19
  
TOO-BIG-TO-JAIL 
In the years following the financial crisis, the media reported on large-
scaled scandals in which the biggest banks were illegally involved. 
Nevertheless, even after it had learned about these scandals, the U.S. 
government only fined rather than prosecuted the relevant banks. This 
approach, which was nicknamed too-big-to-jail, caused a great deal of 
 
 
FIN. 895, 928 (1997) (“Serious estimates of scale economies for U.S. banks over $25 billion will likely 
have to wait for the consolidation of the industry to create enough of these large banks to yield 
reasonable estimates.”). Generally, “economies of scope” refers to the lowering average cost for a firm 
in producing two or more products. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. 
ECON. REV. 268, 268 (1981). 
 15. JAN SCHILDBACH, DEUTSCHE BANK: DB RESEARCH, UNIVERSAL BANKS: OPTIMAL FOR 
CLIENTS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY (2012), http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_ 
EN-PROD/PROD 0000000000296976.pdf.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay Record Fine to Settle Money-Laundering Charges, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at B3, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/hsbc-to-pay-
record-fine-to-settle-money-laundering-charges/?_r=0 (“Federal and state authorities secured a record 
$1.92 billion payment from HSBC . . . to settle charges that the banking giant transferred billions of 
dollars for nations under United States sanctions, enabled Mexican drug cartels to launder tainted 
money through the American financial system, and worked closely with Saudi Arabian banks linked to 
terrorist organizations.”).  
 18. Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall 
Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1428 (2013). 
 19. See Cornelius Hurley, GAO Must Ensure Accurate Accounting in TBTF Study, AM. BANKER 
(Sept. 24, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/gao-must-ensure-accurate-
accounting-in-tbtf-study-1062337-1.html?ET=americanbanker:e17059:761074a:&st=email&utm_source 
=editorial&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=AB_Intraday_092513 (detailing the harm to taxpayers 
resulting from both bank bailouts and large bank exemptions from criminal statutes).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/7
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anger and frustration.
20
 Trying to justify this policy, Attorney General 
Holder explained that the DOJ cannot indict big financial institutions 
because doing so might harm the economy. Holder, testifying before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, said that he is “concerned that the size of 
some of these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult 
for us to prosecute them when we are hit with indications that if we do 
prosecute—if we do bring a criminal charge—it will have a negative 
impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.”21 
Some have argued that this declaration is unsurprising given that in 1999, 
as Deputy Attorney General, Holder instructed prosecutors to consider 
“collateral consequences” when determining whether or not to prosecute 
corporations.
22
  
This statement also makes sense given the current reality, in which the 
U.S. government preferred, instead of prosecution,
23
 a $13 billion 
settlement in November 2013 with JPMorgan for its role in creating the 
2008 crisis.
24
 One of the reasons for doing so is that whatever acts 
JPMorgan had allegedly done were of such magnitude that prosecution 
through the judicial system would have prolonged the proceedings not just 
over years, but possibly over generations. Thus, prosecuting JPMorgan 
appears to have been unrealistic and out of the question. JPMorgan was 
allowed to become too-big-to-jail, and now it is out of the reach of any 
 
 
 20. Press Release, Or. Sen. Jeff Merkley, Merkley Blasts “Too Big to Jail” Policy for 
Lawbreaking Banks (Dec. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Merkley], available at http://www.merkley.senate 
.gov/newsroom/press/release?id=42a606e4-7c45-42ed-8348-c77c508f9281 (reprinting Oregon Senator 
Jeff Merkley’s open letter to Eric Holder criticizing the U.S. Department of Justice for its no-
prosecution policy and demanding explanations). One month after Senator Merkley’s letter, twenty-
four members of Congress echoed his admonitions in a separate letter to Attorney General Holder. 
Letter from George Miller, et al., Members of Cong., to Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Jan. 14, 2013), 
available at http://georgemiller.house.gov/sites/georgemiller.house.gov/files/HSBC%20Letter.pdf.  
 21. Transcript: Attorney General Eric Holder on ‘Too Big to Jail’, AM. BANKER (Mar. 6, 2013, 
3:15 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_45/transcript-attorney-general-eric-holder-on-
too-big-to-jail-1057295-1.html; see also Peter Schroeder, Holder: Big Banks’ Size Complicates 
Prosecution Efforts, THE HILL (Mar. 6, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/ 
banking-financial-institutions/286583-holder-big-banks-size-complicates-prosecution-efforts#ixzz2fx 
mQO2Uk. 
 22. See Memorandum from the Deputy Att’y Gen. on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corps. 
to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF; see also Jillian Berman, Eric Holder’s 
1999 Memo Helped Set The Stage For ‘Too Big To Jail’, HUFFINGTON POST. (June 4, 2013, 5:01 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/04/eric-holder-1999-memo_n_ 3384980.html. 
 23. Danielle Kurtzleben, Potential Criminal Charges Loom, but JPMorgan May Remain Too Big 
to Jail, US NEWS (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/11/19/potential-
criminal-charges-loom-but-jpmorgan-may-remain-too-big-to-jail. 
 24. See Peter Eavis & Ben Protess, Considering the Fairness of JPMorgan’s Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 22, 2013, at B1, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/21/considering-the-fairness-of-
jpmorgans-deal/?_r=0. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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government, even if such benefits offend the public’s sense of justice. And 
while the DOJ declared that it “does not release individuals from civil 
charges, nor does it release JPMorgan or any individuals from potential 
criminal prosecution,”25 this statement does not mean much. According to 
certain studies, major banks normally do not get prosecuted, and banks 
that do typically receive deferred or non-prosecution agreements, which 
are settlements that avoid indictment or convictions.
26 Similarly, 
individuals are also rarely prosecuted, and that helps the firm avoid 
criminal convictions as well.
27
 They believe that this is the result of the 
government not wanting the major banks to lose their banking licenses, or 
to hurt their reputation and consequently innocent shareholders.
28
 
IF YOU BUILD IT, THEY WILL COME 
Letting JPMorgan and other large banks dodge criminal liability has 
several negative effects. First, it “effectively vitiates the law as written by 
Congress,”29 as Congress had no intentions to declare that violations of 
money laundering, terrorist financing, or fraud would only constitute civil 
violations.  
Second, giving the large banks de facto special treatment conflicts with 
the basic constitutional provision of equality under the law,
30
 as it 
essentially requires applying the law in such a way that discriminates in 
favor of the largest banks. Thus, it contradicts one of the most 
fundamental American legal principles,
31
 reinforced by the Supreme 
 
 
 25. Kurtzleben, supra note 23.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Michael Rothfeld, Firms Get Penalized, but Many Workers Don’t, WALL ST. J. (Jan 16, 
2014, 7:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230441910457932496245977 
1186 (this information is based on an analysis of data done by University of Virginia professor of law 
Brandon Garrett, in his forthcoming book TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS). 
 28. Kurtzleben, supra note 23. 
 29. Merkley, supra note 20.  
 30. Cass R Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law, 74 SOC. RES. 1, 
11 (2007) (arguing that “[c]onstitutional provisions usually protect such rights as . . . equality under 
the law”). 
 31. This principle is founded on the (i) Equal Protection Clause; (ii) Due Process Clause 
(containing an equal protection component comparable to the Equal Protection Clause in the 
Fourteenth Amendment); and (iii) Substantive Due Process doctrine. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V; Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, 
Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 841–43 (2003). These 
clauses and doctrines allow challenges of discrimination resulting from government actions and laws.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/7
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Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.32 Accordingly, reflecting upon this 
practice, a federal judge in New York noted that for judges who take an 
oath to apply the law equally, the ‘too-big-to-jail’ excuse is troubling, and 
disregards the principle of equality under the law.
33
  
Third, while the troubling too-big-to-jail policy refers to the 
prosecution of financial institutions, rather than their senior executives, it 
appears that the DOJ is also uninterested in prosecuting the individuals 
who worked at those banks and led their negative behavior.
34
 In fact, the 
DOJ has not pursued any of the large banks’ executives that were 
personally involved in the scandals that took place in the last few years 
despite the fact that several government agencies clearly stated in reports 
that in their opinion, fraud and unethical behavior both caused and 
exacerbated the financial crisis. For example, the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, in its final report, “uses variants of the word ‘fraud’ no fewer 
than 157 times in describing what led to the crisis, concluding that there 
was a ‘systemic breakdown,’ not just in accountability, but also in ethical 
behavior. . . . [T]he crisis was in material respects the product of 
intentional fraud.”35  
Finally, making TBTF banks pay large fines in lieu of being prosecuted 
for their illegal actions is also problematic because it creates negative 
incentives for large banks in the contexts of (i) desired ethical standards 
 
 
 32. Although many have assumed, including the Supreme Court in historic cases such as Palmer 
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971) (motive irrelevant where swimming pool closings affect 
races equally) and Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (shutting 
down all public schools in wake of desegregation order without intent evaluation), that action that 
carries the effect of discrimination violates principles of equality, the Court later narrowed the 
Constitution’s guarantee of equality under the law, ruling that intent was the standard. See Brando 
Simeo Starkey, A Failure of the Fourth Amendment & Equal Protection’s Promise: How the Equal 
Protection Clause Can Change Discriminatory Stop and Frisk Policies, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 131 
(2012). The intent doctrine took full shape in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Vill. of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Accordingly, courts examine 
purposefulness and intent to discriminate rather than merely disproportionate impact upon a certain 
group. And intent is most easily proven where discrimination takes the form of a classification on the 
face of a statute or rule. However, the intent doctrine may not apply here, nor should it narrow equal 
protection principles, because Attorney General Holder’s comments make clear that the government’s 
failure to prosecute the biggest banks is intentional, purposeful, and applicable only to a subset of 
financial institutions.  
 33. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ archives/2014/jan/09/ 
financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/?pagination=false. Judge Rakoff is a United States 
District Judge for the Southern District of New York.  
 34. “[N]ot a single high-level executive has been successfully prosecuted in connection with the 
recent financial crisis, and given the fact that most of the relevant criminal provisions are governed by 
a five-year statute of limitations, it appears likely that none will be.” Id.  
 35. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and business-doing norms in the financial markets; (ii) encouraging 
criminal behavior by guaranteeing a “carrot”—it is worth the banks’ while 
to engage in criminal behavior because even if a fine is higher than the 
criminally-obtained profit, which is usually not the case, the fine can be 
paid for from the fruits of additional crimes committed in the future;
36
 and 
(iii) encouraging criminal behavior by eliminating any potential “stick”—
ensuring large banks that the only thing they have to lose is money.
37
 
WHAT’S NEXT? 
Concerned with this too-big-to-jail policy, legislatures have recently 
attempted to introduce bills that would bolster U.S. anti-money laundering 
laws, close loopholes, support the flow of information, and if nothing else, 
give financial regulators greater civil powers to hold senior executives at 
large banks accountable for misconduct happening on their watch.
38
 
In addition, as suggested by a U.S. district judge, the government can 
and should criminally charge executives in TBTF banks because, despite 
Attorney General Holder’s concern about the economic reverberations of 
prosecuting TBTF banks, those banks would not collapse if one or more of 
their high level executives were prosecuted, as opposed to the institutions 
themselves.
39
 For example, concerns were raised in the U.S. over whether 
criminally prosecuting HSBC, the London-based bank that was involved 
in money laundering, would lead to its collapse and damage the financial 
system. Independently of how the government treats HSBC as an 
institution, it can and should charge its senior executives that made 
culpable decisions regarding the money laundering.
40
 Moreover, liability 
should stand on the well-established “willful blindness” or “conscious 
 
 
 36. John Titus, How Obama Surrendered Sovereignty to The Criminal Banking Cartel, DAILY 
BAIL (Apr. 24, 2013, 5:33 PM), http://dailybail.com/home/how-obama-surrendered-sovereignty-to-
the-criminal-banking-ca.html (“[Deferred prosecution] looks very much like a green light for big 
banks to commit crimes with wild abandon while pretending that fines levied in lieu of prosecution 
(a) are something other than a small tax paid by the banks doing business as criminal enterprises, 
(b) cannot simply be paid for from the fruit of additional crimes in the future, and thus (c) do not 
guarantee more crime.”).  
 37. “When prosecutors choose not to prosecute to the full extent of the law in a case as egregious 
as this, the law itself is diminished. The deterrence that comes from the threat of criminal prosecution 
is weakened, if not lost.” Editorial, Too Big to Indict, Dec. 12, 2012, N.Y. TIMES, at A38, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/opinion/hsbc-too-big-to-indict.html?_r=2&ee.  
 38. See, e.g., Press Release, Comm. on Fin. Svcs.—Democrats, Leading House Democrats 
Introduce Bills to Deter Money Laundering And Hold Executives Responsible (Oct. 24, 2013), 
available at http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1597. 
 39. Rakoff, supra note 33.  
 40. Titus, supra note 36.  
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disregard” doctrine, which has been used to infer that top executives had 
knowledge of the dubious nature of the activities that their institutions 
were involved in.
41
 The Supreme Court has weighed in on this idea, and 
has recently concluded that  
[t]he doctrine of willful blindness is well established in criminal 
law. Many criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted 
knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine of willful 
blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the reach of these 
statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of 
critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.
42
  
If the DOJ refuses to prosecute large financial institutions, it can still 
prosecute their executives, and must if the federal government is serious 
about preventing another financial crisis. The ambiguous threat of 
economic harm resulting from prosecution is not applicable to prosecuting 
individuals, and the prospect of protracted litigation is no justification for 
failure to protect consumers from shouldering the banking industry’s 
criminal activity.  
 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068–69 (2011). 
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